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 Abstract: 
 
Based on 26 case studies, this paper investigates the socio-economic causes of the 
inflow of FDI and its policy implications in Dongguan. The favourable factors for 
foreign investors in Dongguan can be categorised under the Dunning’s OLI 
(ownership, locational and internalisation advantages) framework. This paper 
argues that factors other than policy incentive, such as sub-contractual and pseudo 
integration, are playing more important roles to attract the inflow of FDI and 
maintain the high level of economic growth in Dongguan. This finding questions 
the effectiveness of policy incentives, such as tax-break, implemented by the 
government as a mean to attract the inflow of FDI in Dongguan. The existence of 
“Chinese crony capitalism” calls for further improvement in the implementation 
of laws and regulations in Dongguan and the reduction of bureaucratic red-tape by 
the central and local governments. 
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1 Introduction 
At US$45.3 billion in 1997, China was the world’s second-largest 
recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) after the United States (US) for the 
fourth consecutive year.1 Labour-intensive, low technology and low value-added 
manufacturing relocated from Hong Kong are the generally perceived 
characteristics of foreign-financed firms in the Pearl River Delta. But how can we 
reconcile the fact that a number of Transnational Corporations (TNCs) in different 
industrial sectors selected Dongguan as (one of) their manufacturing bases in 
China?2 What are the favourable investment factors in Dongguan? What are the 
policy implications of this phenomenon? 
Being one of the “Four Little Tigers” (sixiaohu) in Guangdong province, 
Dongguan municipality (dejishi or prefectural city, hereinafter called Dongguan 
for simplicity) has been one of the fastest growing cities in the Pearl River Delta 
since the implementation of open policy in 1979.3 As the national symbol of 
processing and assembling (P&A), Taiping administrative region (guanliqu) of 
Humen town in Dongguan was the site for the first P&A (handbag manufacturing) 
firm established in September of 1978 in China.4 With its excellent location and 
strong ethnic linkage with the overseas Chinese, Dongguan is popular for foreign 
investors. 
Despite the significance for FDI policy, only a small amount of research 
has been conducted in Dongguan. Most, if not all, of the literature in Dongguan 
consists of Chinese official internal reports, which are not accessible to the 
general public in China, e.g. Gao, Liu and Ye, etc.5 In the literature published in 
English, with the exception of Yeung6, no systematic and in-depth research has 
been published on the relationship between FDI and the socio-economic 
development of Dongguan. Thoburn et al., Thoburn, Chau and Tang, Chui, 
Fitzgerald, and Zhang and Hung covered Dongguan in the study of FDI in 
southern China briefly.7 However, none of these studies is comprehensive. With 
the exception of Shenzhen, there is hardly any comprehensive study on the causes 
of FDI conducted at a micro-geographical scale (e.g. municipal level) in China, 
even taking account of the Chinese official internal reports. This bizarre 
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phenomenon is partly due to the scarcity of information and the difficulties of data 
accessibility, e.g. the official statistics on Dongguan were scarcely comprehensive 
and most of them were not disclosed until 1998. This explains why the bulk of 
literature is either confined to macro or meso-geographical scale studies (e.g. Lau 
et al., Chu, Huang, Cheung, Kueh and Ash, and Takahashi, etc.)8 or else focus on 
the characteristics of certain industries or investment categories (e.g. Ho, Child 
and Yan, etc.).9 
Rather than focusing on the economic growth per se, this paper 
investigates the socio-economic causes of the inflow of FDI and its policy 
implications in Dongguan. Unlike the conventional definition of FDI, which is 
defined as “the act of acquiring assets outside one’s home country”10 or the 
“cross-border expenditures to acquire or expand corporate control of productive 
assets”11, the official Chinese counterpart incorporates three forms of direct 
foreign-invested enterprises – sanzi qiye, that is, equity joint venture (EJV), 
contractual joint venture (CJV) and wholly foreign-owned venture (WFV) – and 
joint exploration of resources. The conventional definition of FDI embraces WFV 
and EJV, but excludes CJV and sanlai yibu. Sanlai yibu (three forms of P&A and 
compensation trade) are defined by the Chinese authority as “other forms of 
foreign investment” rather than FDI. For simplicity, this paper defines FDI as the 
inflow of foreign capital (including those from Hong Kong and Macau) in forms 
of sanzi qiye and sanlai yibu. It must be emphasised that this paper does not 
attempt to modify the existing FDI model or propose a new FDI paradigm.12 
Dunning’s eclectic paradigm of international production, which postulates 
that ownership-specific, locational and internalisation advantages (the OLI 
paradigm) are dominant factors affecting the pattern of FDI, is used to explain the 
favourable investment environment in Dongguan.13 The ownership-specific 
advantages (O) are the prerequisite for contractual resource transfers, exportation 
or FDI by TNCs in the home country, i.e. the exclusive production and technical 
know-how, and managerial and marketing skills possessed by TNCs in the home 
country superior to those of its rival firms in the host country. Through exporting 
to or investing directly in the host country, TNCs in the home country can reduce 
their transaction costs and internalise the externalities in factor or product markets. 
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These internalisation advantages (I) are larger than the benefit from licensing 
production know-how to foreign firms. Moreover, the theory postulates that TNCs 
moved out of their country of origin because the pull factors of locational 
endowments (L), such as low labour costs and preferential investment incentives 
available from the host country, are stronger than those in the home country. In 
other words, TNCs select FDI because it can reap the locational advantages 
enjoyed by the local industry in the host country, in which direct exportation and 
licensing cannot be obtained. 
Between 1996 and 1997, semi-structural interviews on 26 foreign-financed 
enterprises located in seven towns of Dongguan were conducted by the author.14 
The sample firms ranged across various manufacturing sectors: plastics and metal 
products, textile and clothing, toys, leather products, jewellery, electrical 
appliance, electronic products, and printing and paper products sectors. The 
overwhelming majority of the sample are investors of Hong Kong origin engaged 
in the P&A investment. Most of the firms investigated (15 cases) are located in 
Humen town. In terms of industrial sectors, textile and clothing (eight cases) and 
manufacturing of electrical appliances (six cases) accounts for more than half of 
the total firms interviewed. In terms of employment size, the medium-sized firms 
(51-500 workers) represent more than two-thirds of the cases. However, it is 
arbitrary and even misleading to use the number of workers to determine the size 
of firm, as a large-scale, highly automated firm might employ only 200 workers 
but a medium-size labour-intensive clothing firm may be employing 500 or more 
workers. The majority of the firms investigated belong to the class of small and 
medium-scale enterprises (SMEs), if capital value and size of factory premises are 
used to determine the size of firm. 
The unprecedented development of the physical and social infrastructure 
has literally shaped Dongguan’s landscape. The nine major favourable factors for 
foreign investors in Dongguan can be categorised under the Dunning’s OLI 
framework. This paper argues that factors other than policy incentive, such as sub-
contractual and pseudo integration, are playing more important roles to attract the 
inflow of FDI and maintain the high level of economic growth in Dongguan. This 
finding questions the effectiveness of policy incentives, such as tax-break, 
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implemented by the government as a mean to attract the inflow of FDI in 
Dongguan. Furthermore, the existence of “Chinese crony capitalism” calls for 
further improvement in the implementation of laws and regulations in Dongguan 
and the reduction of bureaucratic red-tape by the central and local governments. 
The background of Dongguan is described in section 2 briefly. The 
investment environment in Dongguan is illustrated in terms of infrastructure, 
production factors (section 3) and bureaucracy (section 4). The nine major 
favourable factors for foreign investors in Dongguan and the applicability of the 
OLI paradigm are summarised in section 5, before the conclusions and 
implications of this paper are presented in section 6. 
2 Background to Dongguan 
Dongguan is located in the middle of the Shenzhen-Guangzhou economic 
corridor in the Pearl River Delta of southern China. To be more specific, 
Dongguan is 60 km south of Guangzhou municipality (the capital of Guangdong) 
and 97 km north of Shenzhen municipality (located just adjacent to Hong Kong). 
At present, Dongguan is divided into 33 administrative towns/districts within its 
2,465 km2 of land. In the 1990s, about 900,000 of the overseas Chinese population 
(700,000 in Hong Kong and Macau, and another 200,000 in 65 different 
countries) originated in Dongguan.15 
Dongguan was transformed into an export-oriented manufacturing-based 
economy through P&A induced industrialisation and outward-oriented 
commercial agriculture during the first stage of economic reform up to the late-
1980s (the “first industrial revolution”). After being upgraded to municipal status 
in 1988, Dongguan invested heavily in the construction and improvement of its 
infrastructure, in particular transportation, power supplies and 
telecommunications. The “second industrial revolution” aims at transforming the 
sanzi qiye and its supporting service sectors into higher value-added, skill-
intensive and higher technology sectors is implementing since the mid-1990s.16 
The privately-funded enterprises in Dongguan were selected by the government to 
crowd-in other complementary foreign-financed high value-added and high 
technology industries.17 The Dongguan government also implemented a 
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Singaporean-style “pioneer industrial policy” and set up a “high technology 
industrial zone”. The government gives exemption from taxation, assistance in 
finance and human capital for privately-funded enterprises that invest in the 
selected high technology industries, e.g. biotechnology, vehicle component 
manufacturing, etc.18 
The result of economic reform in Dongguan is shown by an array of 
extraordinary economic statistics. The real GDP and real GDP per capita growth 
rate reached double-digits each year, with the exception of five years: 1978-80, 
1987-89 and 1992.19 Between 1978 and 1997, the average annual growth rate of 
14% of real GDP (higher than the 12% in Guangdong and 9% in China) and 13% 
of real GDP per capita (higher than the 11% in Guangdong and 8% in China) 
made Dongguan one of the fastest growing regions in the world. During the two 
decades of reform in Dongguan, real GDP jumped by eleven times to 6.98 billion 
yuan, while real GDP per capita increased by nine times to the all time high of 
4,742 yuan in 1997. The real GDP per capita in Dongguan was double that of 
Guangdong and triple that of China.20 
Even including migrants in Dongguan when data are available, the average 
annual growth rate in real GDP per capita between 1986 and 1997 was still 
respectable at 5%. Despite the austerity policy implemented nation wide and that 
the number of migrants in Dongguan doubled during the 1990s, the real GDP per 
capita doubled, from a relatively high figure of 1,371 yuan in 1990, to 2,391 yuan 
in 1997. That is to say, the high growth rate in Dongguan was able to offset the 
tremendous increased of migrants population in Dongguan from 15,622 in 1986 to 
about 1.45 million in 1997, which is as large as the local population.21 
In real industrial and agricultural output value, the average annual growth 
rate in Dongguan was 20% between 1978 and 1997. The gross value of industrial 
and agricultural output in Dongguan as a percentage of Guangdong’s increased 
from 2.8% in 1978 to 4.6% in 1997 is another evidence of the economic strength 
of Dongguan. Dongguan’s increasing share of gross value of industrial output in 
Guangdong, from 2.1% in 1978 to 4.7% in 1997, and the corresponding decrease 
in share of gross value of agricultural output, from 4.5% in 1978 to 2.9% in 1997, 
illustrates its rapid industrialisation.22 
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Dongguan is popular for foreign investors. In terms of absolute value, the 
contracted value of FDI in Dongguan increased enormously from US$4.76 million 
in 1979 to the all time high of US$3.55 billion in 1993 before dropping to 
US$1.21 billion in 1997. The utilised value of FDI also rose impressively from 
US$1.73 million in 1979 to the all time high of US$1.21 billion in 1997. In 1997, 
the cumulative contracted FDI in Dongguan reached US$17.92 billion and the 
corresponding utilised value of FDI reached US$7.02 billion. This is equivalent to 
12% of the cumulative contracted and utilised value of FDI in Guangdong 
between 1980 and 1997 and 3.5% of the cumulative contracted value of FDI and 
3.4% of the cumulative utilised value of FDI in China between 1979 and 1997. In 
per capita term, the growth of utilised FDI in Dongguan is as impressive as in 
Singapore.23 In 1979, the utilised FDI per capita in Dongguan was only US$1.54, 
which was much lower than the US$8.51 recorded in Singapore in 1965 (when 
Singapore became an independent country). In 1997, the per capita value in 
Dongguan increased dramatically to US$825, which was even higher than the 
US$661 recorded by Singapore in 1986 (but lower than the US$1,084 in 1987). 
Even when the migrant population in Dongguan is taken into consideration, the 
per capita value of US$416 recorded in 1997 attained the 1985 level of Singapore 
of US$409.24 
As a result of export-orientation, the export value of Dongguan increased 
tremendously from US$39 million in 1978 (for Customs figure, US$56.83 million 
in 1990) to almost US$5 billion in 1997 (for Customs figure, US$11.37 billion in 
1997): an average annual growth rate of 30%.25 Apart from 1984 and 1989, when 
economic retrenchment occurred due to the over-heated Chinese economy, 
Dongguan recorded a double-digit annual growth rate of export value. The export 
value per capita increased from a mere US$35 in 1978 to US$295 in 1989, before 
increasing by another eleven times to US$3,397 in 1997.26 
3 Physical Infrastructure & Factors of Production 
In this section, the physical infrastructure and production factors in 
Dongguan are discussed. 
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3.1 Physical Infrastructure 
Accessibility is a significant locational factor considered by foreign 
investors. With its particular geographical features and strategic location, roads 
play a more significant role than other means of transportation in Dongguan.27 
Within one decade of tremendous investment by the Dongguan 
government, the roads in Dongguan were transformed from narrow, uneven, 
sandy or even muddy lanes into cement or asphalt-covered motorways connecting 
all villages to the 33 towns and districts of Dongguan. Subsequently, the time 
spent travelling from Hong Kong to Humen town was reduced from six hours in 
1990 to less than two hours in 1997. In terms of accessibility, the total length of 
road doubled from 1,225 km in 1980 to 2,330 km in 1997 (Table 1). As a result, 
the road-area density increased dramatically from 49.7 km/100km2 in 1980 to 94.5 
km/100km2 in 1997. Apart from building new roads and bridges, the quality of the 
roads improved tremendously as the total length of all-weather roads covered with 
cement or asphalt increased from 719 km in 1980 to 1,949 km in 1995. Moreover, 
the proportion of graded to non-graded motor roads increased from 29% in 1980 
to 90% in 1997. The first-grade motorways were built from scratch in 1987, 690 
km by 1997, which accounted for 30% of total road length in Dongguan. In 1993, 
the 315 km of first-grade motorway was equivalent to about half of the total 
length of all first-grade motorways in Guangdong.28 
[PLACED TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
The tremendous improvement in accessibility was achieved by a number 
of strategic major programmes carried out by the Dongguan government during 
the 1990s. In inter-regional accessibility, the most significant development is the 
Guangzhou-Shenzhen Superhighway and the Tiger Gate Bridge. With 50 km of 
motorway passing through ten different towns in Dongguan, the four-lane two-
way Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Zhuhai Superhighway has significantly improved the 
routes between Hong Kong, Dongguan and Guangzhou. The Tiger Gate Bridge in 
Humen was opened in 1997. With a capacity of 10,000 cars per day, the Bridge 
has not only improved the accessibility of Dongguan and the Pearl River Delta 
tremendously as it reduces the travelling distance between Shenzhen and Zhuhai 
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by 100 km, but also helps to alleviate traffic congestion in Guangzhou. In intra-
regional accessibility, the most significant development includes the upgrading of 
four major motorways, the construction of four first-grade ring-roads and 13 
motorway networks.29 
There is a consensus among foreign investors that transportation in 
Dongguan has been improving dramatically over the years. The costs of 
transportation is rising but it was still acceptable for the majority of interviewees. 
Severe traffic congestion after traffic accidents in motorway was common in the 
early 1990s as it was very difficult to locate a telephone along the road to call for 
help. This demonstrates the significance of telecommunications and its inter-
dependence with roads for infrastructure development. 
The electricity supply plays a vital role in the location of foreign 
investment in Dongguan. During the early 1980s, where power shortages and 
electricity blackouts were common, Dongguan’s electricity supply relied mainly 
on the province-owned thermal power plant in Shajiao of Humen town. 
Apart from a number of small capacity power plants operated by township 
governments, the Dongguan government has invested heavily in locally and 
provincially funded power plants to improve the power supply. Between 1987 and 
1990, the Dongguan government invested US$247 million and 82 million yuan in 
building the Humen power plant, expanded the capacities of Dongguan Sugar 
power plant and City power plant in Guancheng district. The result was an 
increase of 386,340 kilowatt (KW) of generated capacity and 560,000 KW of 
power supply by various electricity stations. This translates into more than three 
billion kilowatt/hour (KWH) of annual capacity with all three power plants 
operating at peak capacity. Between 1991 and 1993, the Dongguan government 
injected another one billion yuan into the Humen power plant and 340 million 
yuan into the provincially-owned Shajiao power plant. This resulted in an 
additional 245,000 KW of power supply. Furthermore, the Dongguan government 
has improved the access of power supply in remote areas through the construction 
of 20 electric sub-stations. In 1991, all 509 administrative regions in Dongguan 
had installed their own electricity stations.30 
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Despite the tremendous regional differentiation in electricity charges and 
its rising price, it is not a major factor in the locational choice for foreign 
investment in Dongguan as the stability and abundance of the power supply is the 
prime concern of foreign investors.31 The regional difference in electricity charges 
is a result of different surcharge levied by different local power plants. A typical 
example is Humen town. Electricity costs 0.89 yuan/KWH in Botou of the Daning 
administrative region, while it cost 1.3 yuan/KWH in the Beishan administrative 
region, which is an adjacent village a stone’s throw away. In Taiping 
administrative region, about ten minutes drive, it costs 0.66 yuan/KWH. It seems 
that the local authorities have no formal guidelines for settling prices.32 Except in 
the energy-consuming sectors, all the interviewees agreed the economic loss from 
failure to deliver goods on time (and the subsequent loss of customers) due to 
unannounced power blackouts is much higher than the differences in electricity 
prices. 
The development of telecommunications is unprecedented in Dongguan’s 
history. An automated switchboard for programmed telephone and optical-fibre 
cable communication systems was installed during the early 1980s. Through five 
different stages, the capacity of the automated switchboard increased from 11,400 
sets in 1985 to 577,600 sets in 1997 (Table 2). The number of household 
telephone subscribers increased from 3,000 in 1980 to 426,500 in 1997. In 1990, 
Dongguan was already the city with the highest teledensity (the number of 
telephones per 100 people) in China. 
[PLACED TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
To improve the efficiency of the telecommunications system, city, village 
and long-distance telephone lines were combined into the first integrated automate 
digital telephone network in China through fibre-optic, digital microwave or 
ordinary cables in 1989. Subsequently, the city-village direct telephone and fax 
services went into operation. As alternative or supplementary communication 
devices, fax machines, pagers and mobile phones are rapidly gaining market share 
(Table 2). Given the high cost of mobile phones for ordinary people, this device is 
not only an effective communication tool for those desperate users who need to 
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keep in touch with others all the time, but also acts as a symbol of wealth in the 
booming economy.33 
Apart from local connections, Dongguan started an IDD telephone service 
for direct dialling to 100 domestic cities and 17 foreign countries in 1986. Within 
four years, the IDD service was directly connected to 250 cities in China and 150 
foreign countries. To cater for the booming demand, the number of 
telecommunications service centres in Dongguan was increased from 50 in 1980 
to 339 in 1997 (Table 2). 
3.2 Factors of Production 
The labour market can be divided into two broad categories: local and 
migrants. Most of the local workers in Dongguan are former farmers. At present, 
they either work in foreign-financed firms or are engaged in private businesses. 
Most manual workers, especially the unskilled, are migrants from other counties 
of Guangdong or Sichuan, Hunan, Guangxi, Hubei and Heilongjiang. Most are 
farmers aged under 20 for females and under 30 for males. The average age of the 
newly arrived migrant workers tends to get younger: 17-18 years old.34 
In terms of absolute numbers, migrants are the backbone of the labour 
force in Dongguan. In 1997, there were 1.31 million migrant workers (accounting 
for 91% of its 1.44 million local population), which was 49% higher than the 
876,053 local workers.35 However, the generally perceived abundant supply of 
cheap labour is misleading since there is a mismatch in the labour market: an 
excess demand for skilled female workers in the labour-intensive industries and an 
excess supply of unskilled male and female workers.36 The low level of versatility 
to adapt and low productivity of migrants is understandable, as most of them are 
farmers who have little or no working experience in the manufacturing sector. The 
mismatch in the labour market leading to voluntary unemployment – the skilled 
(female) workers resign and search for jobs with better monetary and non-
monetary remuneration – increases production cost in terms of labour recruitment 
and training, and product quality control. Furthermore, migrant workers tend to 
change jobs before settling down with a firm since “most of the newly arrived 
migrant workers work for a few days to a few months and then exaggerate their 
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work experience to get a higher paid job in another firm.”37 Ten to twenty yuan 
makes a different as the majority of them earn less than 200 yuan in their 
hometowns. This explains the 10-50% (or higher after the Chinese New Year) of 
worker turnover rate in foreign-financed firms. 
In 1997, an unskilled migrant worker earned about 300 yuan a month 
while a skilled technical worker could earn up to 1,000 yuan per month. The 
increase in wage is about 2% higher than the inflation rate over time. Given the 
rapid depreciation of Renminbi to USD from 1.51:1 in 1980 to 8.28:1 in 1997, the 
wage increase was in fact much lower in real terms for foreign investors.38 The 
geographical variation in wages can be significance. For unskilled workers, the 
monthly wage ranged from 300-350 yuan in Tangxia town to 310-470 yuan in 
Humen town. For skilled workers or technicians, the monthly wage is 800-900 
yuan in Xiegang town and 700 yuan in Humen town. In general, the wages of 
workers in Dongguan is 5-10% that of Hong Kong. Even when the low 
productivity of migrants is taken into consideration, the wage of workers in 
Dongguan is still about 70% lower than their counterparts in Hong Kong. 
However, the “real” competitive advantage of labour market in Dongguan 
is the overwhelming majority of migrant workers are willing to work over-time 
with little additional payment. A Hong Kong entrepreneur claimed that “I just 
have to pay two to three yuan an hour more than the normal wage and 95% of 
them are willing to work over-time. In Hong Kong, most workers are reluctant to 
work over-time even with double pay!”39 This provides a much greater degree of 
flexibility for the firm to accept large orders during the hectic peak season.40 
The typical industrial site in Dongguan has two blocks – one in the 
workplace and the other is for accommodation. The quality of factory premises 
varies from good to very poor, due to the quality of original building and its 
routine maintenance. The accessibility and geographical location of factory 
premises determines its rent. For example, it costs 4,200 yuan per month in Qingxi 
town, 12,000 yuan per month in Fenggang town and 13,000 yuan per month in 
Xiegang town for an ordinary sized factory premise (about 16,000 m3). In Humen 
town, it cost 10,000 yuan a month of rent for small factory premises. Although the 
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rising rate of rent for factory premises is almost twice that of inflation, it is still 
much cheaper (70-90%) than in Hong Kong.41 
Due to the higher minimum amount of investment in sanzi qiye, most 
SMEs from Hong Kong were registered as “collective ownership and P&A”, even 
if they were operated as WFVs (with the exception that factory managers were 
appointed by the local government). Since a number of Hong Kong investors only 
moved their machinery into Dongguan, it was not uncommon to set up a P&A 
firm with a registered capital of 100,000 yuan during the early 1980s. This 
explains a large number of SMEs located in Dongguan that are not operating in 
the “original” form of P&A, with foreign investors holding all the financial and 
managerial power while Chinese partners only lease the land and factory premises 
to their foreign partners.42 The “alternative” form of P&A common in Dongguan 
is a way of overcoming the managerial and financial constraints associated with 
central government regulations for foreign investment. This demonstrates the 
flexibility of the Dongguan government regarding foreign investment. 
With the growth of the economy over time, the local governments in 
Dongguan are being more selective about the type of foreign investment.43 A 
number of sanzi qiye investment projects in various sectors funded by Japanese, 
Taiwanese and European have been established in Dongguan. The P&A 
investment format is still welcomed by the government as it is regarded as more 
flexible. Coupled with inflation and economic growth, the unofficial minimum 
amount of registered capital for P&A was increased to 500,000-600,000 yuan. It is 
indeed the practical minimum amount of investment as the electricity installation 
costs for a typical factory alone can be more than 100,000 yuan. As with other 
production factors, the actual value of the minimum amount of investment for 
P&A varies geographically, e.g. it was one million yuan in Qingxi town and 
500,000 yuan in Changan town in 1997. 
4 Bureaucratic Red-tape & the Abuse of Power 
Despite the openness of the Dongguan government, bureaucratic red-tape 
and power abuse associated with the local government and the Customs still 
exists. 
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4.1 Miscellaneous Fees 
To employ workers, foreign-financed firms have to apply for the following 
permits on their behalf:44 
• Temporary residence permit (this applies to migrants only). 
• Employment permit (this applies to migrants only). 
• Single card or planned maternity card for married employees. 
• Unemployment insurance and old age pension.45 
By law, the amount of the miscellaneous charge is determined by the 
number of workers in the firm, e.g. it can easily over 100 yuan per worker per 
month.46 In reality, the amount payable by foreign-financed firms is negotiable 
and various geographically. After all, it depends on guanxi as those firms with 
better connections can get a more favourable “discount” on the payable fee. This 
explains why the local people with the right connections are employed as factory 
managers and accountants in foreign-financed firms. This also explains why all 
the firms interviewed have under-report the number of workers, by 30-80%, to the 
local government for purposes of tax and miscellaneous fee evasion. 
Despite improvements in the transparency of the system, the situation of 
miscellaneous charges has deteriorated in some regions.47 In an extreme case, a 
foreign-financed firm in Yantian administrative region of Fenggang town had to 
pay 46 types of miscellaneous fees.48 One was a “postal delivery fee” charged by 
the Telecommunications Bureau. In addition to paying the postal fee, the firm had 
to pay a “postal delivery fee” based on the number of workers, e.g. 6-8 yuan per 
worker per annum. This is why the firm only reports 20% of its 200 strong 
workforce to the government. Several entrepreneurs even suggested that they had 
been “cheated by the local government!”49 Moreover, some local governments 
backdated the newly introduced charge several months, even before the formal 
approval of the municipal government had been given.50 This is another reason 
why foreign-financed firms employ local people as factory managers and 
accountants as they have the connections and knowledge to deal with the ever-
changing regulations. 
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It is neither the miscellaneous charges per se nor the total amount of such 
charges that annoys the foreign investors in Dongguan. It is the ambiguity, variety 
and the associated high transaction costs which frustrate foreign entrepreneurs. 
4.2 Connections Cultivation 
It is a public knowledge that entrepreneurs used various methods of 
monetary and non-monetary tactics (including corruption) to cultivate connections 
with government officials, who hold the power in various bureaux but receive 
artificially low salaries. As legal representatives of Chinese partners under the 
(P&A) investment contracts and usually knowing government officials well, 
factory managers are naturally prime candidates to act as the middle-persons to 
assist foreign investors in cultivating a relationship with local government 
officials. In fact, the majority of factory managers in foreign-financed firms are 
local people with (very) close links to influential officials in local government. 
The perception of a partisan and corrupt government is fuelled by its 
business role and the uneven implementation of laws. For instance, an application 
for a foreign investment project is more likely to be approved on time if the 
feasibility study is conducted by a specified consultant company, which is an 
affiliated company of the Dongguan government. The original rationale for setting 
up a consultant company is to standardise the criteria of feasibility study and 
speed up the approval time-lag for venture projects. Nonetheless, the dual role – 
both as the governing body and a profit-making consultant company – of the 
Dongguan government naturally provides ammunition for conspiracy theorists to 
suggest that the standardisation of procedures is de facto a golden excuse to raise 
revenue. As the frequency of factory inspections is determined by the connections 
between owners and factory managers, the implementation of labour and fire 
safety laws is likely to encourage rent-seeking or even on-the-spot bribery to 
avoid hefty fines for violations of fire or labour regulations. 
Even though some well-connected foreign investors are frustrated by the 
“black-box operation” adopted by some local governments in Dongguan: “rule-of-
the-people instead of rule-of-law”.51 Obviously, the power abuse by some officials 
tarnishes the reputation of Dongguan. 
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4.3 Customs 
To facilitate the operation of foreign-financed enterprises and relieve the 
pressure on transportation, the “transferred goods arrangement” allows a foreign-
financed firm to sell and transport their finished goods to another foreign or 
locally-funded firm located in China directly.52 
However, the convenience of the transferred goods arrangement for 
foreign-financed firms is offset by the bureaucratic regulations in import or export 
declaration permits.53 The foreign-financed firms have to submit monthly records 
of the importation of raw materials, the exportation of finished goods and the 
amount of raw materials in stock. The customs declaration procedure (hexiao) is 
used to prevent any illegal re-selling of tariff-free raw materials or machinery 
imported by foreign-financed firms for profit-making purpose. Whenever there is 
any discrepancy between the import and export declaration forms, the Customs 
inspectors would regard undeclared goods as illegal sales for the local market. In 
addition to imposing a fine, the Customs inspectors would impose a surcharge of 
40% of the value of undeclared raw materials on the foreign-financed firm. In 
reality, this documentation imposes extra transaction costs on foreign-financed 
firms and provides golden rent-seeking opportunities for Customs inspectors. 
To offset the relatively low salaries (less than 1,000 yuan a month), 
Customs officials explore the legal loopholes and illegal means to boost their 
incomes. The three most common methods employed by Customs officials to 
generate revenue are as follows: 
• Data entry fee: a Customs affiliated company charges 70 yuan to enter the 
information on the import or export declaration form into a computer. 
• Truck inspection fee: 500 yuan or more.54 
• Fines for false or incorrect declarations: the cargo is impounded and fines 
imposed for any intentional or unintentional discrepancies between import or 
export declaration documents and the cargo in terms of weight and content. 
From the above, it can easily be estimated that the minimum Customs 
charge is 570 yuan if a truck is selected by the officials for inspection. Fines for 
false or incorrect declarations are legitimate since it is a way of discouraging 
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foreign-financed firms from engaging in illegal re-selling of tariff-free raw 
materials to local firms.55 No matter what the rationales behind the truck and 
cargo impoundment enforced by the Customs inspectors, the documentation per 
se is an improvement. Since the procedure is official, it at least provides a way for 
foreign investors to trace and negotiate the release of the detained cargo.56 
There is a “delicate balance” between foreign investors and Customs 
officials. On the one hand, most Customs officials know the rules of the game and 
usually charge a “standard price” to release a cargo.57 On the other hand, no 
foreign investors dare complain as most of them are either afraid of being subject 
to revenge from the Customs officials or fear the exposure of their own illegal 
activities. As there are tens of thousands of container trucks passing through the 
Hong Kong-Shenzhen border every day, the stakes are simply too high and peer 
pressure is too strong not to play the game by its rules – accept bribes. In 
circumstance, both foreign investors and Customs inspectors are engaged in “win-
win” illegal activities: foreign investors are willing to pay to cover up their under-
reporting of tariff-free raw materials in import permits whilst Customs officials 
are content to ask for unauthorised payments. 
Obviously, efforts to maintain Customs as an efficient institution is 
partially tarnished by the intrinsic deficiency of the reform (the artificially low 
salaries of civil servants) and the bad reputation associated with a group of corrupt 
Customs officials. This definitely mitigates against the investment environment in 
Dongguan. Unlike the “early birds” of the early 1980s, the majority of foreign 
investors are now well informed and realise the “hidden” transaction costs of 
doing business in China before establishing their firms. The bottom line is that the 
relocation of manufacturing to southern China, and in Dongguan particularly, is 
one feasible way for them to maintain their competitiveness. 
5 Favourable Investment Factors in Dongguan 
Before discussing the nine major favourable investment factors (ranked 
according to its significance) in Dongguan for foreign investors, four points have 
to be clarified. First, the arguments presented below explain why foreign 
entrepreneurs invest in Dongguan instead of elsewhere within or outside China. 
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Second, the favourable factors are inter-dependent. Third, the following factors 
are summarised from the interviewees’ scripts and so do not include all the 
favourable investment factors that may be considered by other foreign investors. 
Fourth, the following characteristics are not unique and some of them may appear 
in other regions which are popular with Hong Kong investors, e.g. Shenzhen and 
Guangzhou. However, the competitive advantages of foreign-financed firms in 
Dongguan may be higher than in other regions due to the high concentration of 
Hong Kong-funded firms in Dongguan and the relatively “flexible” policy on 
foreign investment implemented by the Dongguan government.58 In fact, the 
demonstration effects of competitive advantage for foreign-financed firms in 
Dongguan are likely to crowd-in more foreign investment in Dongguan, ceteris 
paribus. 
5.1 Sub-contractual & Pseudo Integration 
Rather than operating independently, a number of foreign-financed SMEs 
in complementary and substitute (industrial) sectors located in close proximity 
collaborate informally to achieve economies of scale and dynamic flexibility 
through the following means: 
• By sub-contracting one firm’s order to a network of complementary and 
substitute firms. This practice allows a firm to accept bulk orders beyond its 
production capabilities and capacity.59 
• By ordering in bulk and combining goods from different firms into a single 
shipment, the unit cost of raw material sourcing and transportation is lower 
due to the discounts offered. 
• By sharing of raw materials, tools, machinery and spare parts in case of 
emergency, this allows the network members to enjoy a greater degree of 
flexibility. Moreover, this arrangement reduces the costs of an excessive 
inventory of raw materials. 
• The sharing of P&A production contracts with member firms in the same 
sector to allow the prompt import of raw materials, resources, semi-finished 
goods and the export of finished goods. Since every production contract has its 
own pre-determined import-export quota and lasts for six months, it is 
common for export-oriented foreign-financed firms to over-use or under-use 
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their quotas during the peak and non-peak seasons respectively.60 This form of 
informal contractual transaction (usually an under-the-table transaction 
between friendly firms) is able to circumvent the bureaucracy associated with 
the Customs and the intrinsic constraints of P&A production contracts.61 
Through the informal collaboration and sub-contracting network, the 
agglomerated network of firms is not only has the critical mass to enjoy certain 
aspects of economies of scale belonging to large-scale firms, but can also maintain 
flexibility within each individual firm. This form of networking is de facto the 
dynamic characteristic of Hong Kong-style SMEs, which allows a network of 
SMEs to engage in “David versus Goliath” warfare through competing with the 
large-scale firms. The successes of network firms has naturally crowded-in 
substitute and complementary industries, which is likely to enhance the re-
modelling process of Hong Kong-style SMEs practice in Dongguan as foreign 
investors try to exploit the ownership-specific advantages of economies of scale 
and the internalisation advantages of lower transaction costs in searching and 
bargaining for components supplies and the prompt delivery of cargos. The 
agglomeration of complementary and substitute SMEs based on commercial 
pragmatism can be called “sub-contractual and pseudo integration”. 
5.2 Local Sourcing & Targeting of the Chinese Market 
The agglomeration of complementary industries implies the proximity of 
suppliers of raw materials, packaging components or semi-finished goods. This 
allows foreign-financed firms to source inputs locally and target the Chinese 
market. 
On the one hand, local sourcing reduces transport costs and the time-lag 
for the shipment of raw materials or semi-finished products from foreign-financed 
firms. The ordering and billing paperwork between suppliers and customers is 
usually carried out in the Hong Kong offices and the goods are delivered by the 
appropriate firms located in Dongguan. This division of labour reflects the 
comparative advantages of Hong Kong and Dongguan and this explains why 
foreign-financed firms maintain offices in Hong Kong. 
 
  19 
On the other hand, foreign-financed firms can cater for existing customers 
by locating their manufacturing bases in Dongguan. This is especially the case 
with complementary industries as most of their customers’ manufacturing bases 
have already relocated to southern China. For instance, three-quarters of the total 
output of a Hong Kong-funded cardboard box manufacturing firm in Xiegang 
town supplies foreign-financed firms located in Dongguan or elsewhere in 
southern China. The transport and time costs are prohibitively high for the 
cardboard boxes to be transported from Hong Kong to China. To serve their 
existing customers, the pulling force is becoming irresistible for entrepreneurs 
who hesitate about relocating their manufacturing bases in Dongguan from Hong 
Kong. Moreover, the potential market is much bigger in China. 
The demonstration effects of existing firms is likely to further encourage 
the agglomeration of industry (through cumulative causation of investment) as 
foreign investors explore the locational advantages of establishing their 
manufacturing bases in Dongguan. 
5.3 Ethnic Networks & Personal Connections 
Ethnic networks and connections cultivated with local officials are usually 
inter-related. With the right connections, a foreign-financed firm can not only 
secure “favourable” terms for miscellaneous charges and the foreign exchange 
retention rate, but can also resolve the problems with the Customs. In fact, a 
number of Hong Kong entrepreneurs established firms in their native home 
villages in Dongguan after suggestions from their relatives. Other interviewees 
were persuaded by their colleagues or friends from the Dongguan government. 
To cite three examples, each with a different level of connections or ethnic 
network in affecting the locational decisions of foreign investors. The owner of a 
Hong Kong publicly-listed company, who has two clothing manufacturing EJVs 
in Dongguan, is a friend of Mrs Wu Yi, the former Minister of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Co-operation in China. The head of a Hong Kong-funded P&A 
cardboard box manufacturer selected his brother-in-law’s native village in 
Xiegang town to locate the firm as he can feel assured that “the channel to local 
government is always available” for him.62 Humen town is the native village of 
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the owner of a Hong Kong-funded P&A electric wire manufacturing firm. He 
knows every officer in the local authority and the factory premises are rented from 
his relatives. In fact, Dongguan officials estimate that about half of the Hong 
Kong-based P&A contracts come from former Dongguan residents who emigrated 
decades earlier. The significance of guanxi for the selection of investment location 
is compatible with the survey results reported by Lever-Tracy, Ip and Tracy, and 
Huang.63  
This locational advantage of Dongguan based on kinship and connection is 
unlikely to be disclosed in the questionnaire survey as most foreign investors are 
reluctant to reveal their personal ties with government officials to outsiders. 
5.4 Strategic Location with Low Land & Labour Costs 
As with foreign investment in other LDCs, the strategic location with low 
land and labour costs are significant locational advantages for foreign investors in 
Dongguan. 
The low cost of production factors was especially noticeable during the 
early and late 1980s, e.g. 60 yuan a month for an unskilled worker in 1986. At 
present, the monthly wage is about 300 yuan for an unskilled worker and about 10 
yuan/m3 per month for the rent of factory premises, which is still less than 10% of 
that in Hong Kong. In contrast to the workers in Hong Kong, there are plenty of 
migrant workers in Dongguan who are more than happy to work over-time. This 
explains why the attractiveness of the labour market for foreign investors does not 
fade even with low productivity, rising wages and higher worker turnover, which 
are all well publicised. After all, the total cost of employing four workers (e.g. two 
for sewing and another two for quality checking in a clothing manufacturing firm) 
is still 80-90% less than employing one skilled sewing worker in Hong Kong, with 
the same level of productivity. More importantly, employers have a greater level 
of flexibility of production, which is one of the greatest assets of the SMEs. The 
prompt delivery of quality goods at bargain prices is definitely one of the most 
important competitive factors in the commercial world. 
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In addition to Shenzhen, Dongguan is an ideal place for foreign investors 
due to its accessible and efficient transport networks. Since the majority of 
foreign-financed firms have their offices in Hong Kong for marketing, finance, 
administration and liaison purposes, the location of Dongguan is within “striking 
distance” of their managerial staff based in Hong Kong, e.g. a half or one day 
return trip to the firm in Dongguan is possible. In case of emergency, Hong Kong 
staff can “present themselves personally at the firm within two to three hours.”64 
Those towns nearest to Hong Kong and with direct access by railway or 
motorways are generally more popular for foreign investors, e.g. Humen, 
Changan, Fenggang, Tangxia, Zhangmutou. This locational advantage explains 
why the majority of Hong Kong-funded firms are located in southern China 
instead of western or northern China, where the labour costs are even lower. 
5.5 Effective Channels of Communication 
To facilitate the articulation and mutual understanding of policies 
implemented by central and local governments, the Foreign Entrepreneurs and 
Investment Association has been established by the open-minded officials in 
Changan township government. There are three regular meetings a year, with 
representatives of the foreign investors, Customs and local government officials. 
Apart from being a discussion forum, the meetings provide a feedback mechanism 
for foreign investors and allows them to air their opinions and complaints about 
the existing investment environment. Subsequently, a number of guidelines to 
minimise the chance of illegal levies were issued by the local government. 
A number of Hong Kong entrepreneurs have established non-profit 
commercial organisations in Hong Kong to strengthen their collective bargaining 
and marketing positions.65 They publish their own marketing brochure to attract 
others to invest in the area and have formed an alliance of collaborating firms, e.g. 
Yantian Industrial City in Fenggang town. For collective bargaining, The Hong 
Kong Small and Medium Business Association organises a number of trips to 
Shenzhen and Dongguan to promote dialogue with Customs and local 
governments officials. 
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The availability of a formal channel of communication with the local 
government officials reduces the information costs for clarifying and 
understanding new policies. Moreover, the collective marketing and lobbying 
activities organised by autonomous commercial organisations in Hong Kong is 
able to reduce the transaction costs and improve the lobbying effectiveness that 
would otherwise have to be undertaken by individual firms. This is a form of 
internalisation advantage for foreign investors. 
5.6 Systematic Urban Planning with supporting Social 
Infrastructure 
With the negative press reports (on crime, prostitution, etc.) in the late 
1980s, most Hong Kong people were reluctant to work in southern China initially. 
In addition to the monetary reward, they would like to live comfortably in China. 
The availability of Hong Kong-style social and entertainment facilities, such as 
restaurants, night clubs, Karaoke bars and discos, make Hongkongers feel at 
home. The hotels located in every town centre also provide an ideal place for 
business meetings with potential customers. Apart from the wide, grid system 
motorways that are normal in other towns of Dongguan, the Changan township 
government invested heavily in the improvement of the environment. For 
example, the green belt along every major road and good public hygiene (not the 
lidless rubbish bins that are commonly found elsewhere) made it one of the 
cleanest towns in southern China. This is one of the reasons why it has been able 
to attract 1,300 foreign-financed enterprises, a number of which are JVs with 
TNCs or the subsidiaries of regional conglomerates. It is estimated that about 
100,000 expatriates (mostly Hongkongers) work in foreign-financed firms in 
Dongguan. The interaction of the demand-pull (expatriates demand it) and supply-
push (the provision of facilities) of social infrastructure in terms of a comfortable 
living environment and the proximity of ample entertainment facilities attracts 
even more expatriates to work in Dongguan. 
The comfortable living environment and its associated ample social and 
entertainment facilities can be interpreted as an unorthodox locational factor for 
foreign investment in Dongguan. 
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5.7 Competitive Retention Rate of Foreign Exchange  
The P&A fee is the value-added of the finished products, usually the 
difference between the import value of raw materials and the export value of the 
finished products. Foreign-financed firms have to pay a P&A fee in foreign 
currency (usually in Hong Kong dollars) through Chinese banks in Hong Kong to 
the local External P&A Office in China. A portion of the foreign exchange 
remittance is retained by the local (village) authority as foreign exchange retention 
(there is a discrepancy between the official and local authority exchange rates) 
before converting it into renminbi and depositing it in the accounts of the foreign-
financed firms. 
It appears that there are no concrete guidelines on the percentage of 
foreign exchange retention by different township governments.66 For example, the 
foreign exchange retention rate in Tangxia town was 22% in 1997. That is, 22% of 
the foreign exchange remitted from foreign-financed firms was levied by the 
Tangxia township government as foreign exchange retention, of which 19% was 
the village authority’s charge and the other 3% Tangxia government’s charge. The 
“real” RMB-HKD exchange rate offered by Tangxia town (0.78:1) is in fact 29% 
lower than the open market exchange rate of 1.07:1. In Changan town, the foreign 
exchange retention rate was 25% in 1997, which is 3% higher than that in Tangxia 
town. 
The RMB-HKD foreign exchange retention rate offered by local 
governments in Dongguan is usually between 0.7-0.8:1, which is generally 10-
20% lower than other areas in the Pearl River Delta with the rate of 0.6-0.7:1. The 
lower the foreign exchange retention rate (if one HKD can exchange for more 
RMB), the less the transferred amount of precious foreign exchange required of 
the foreign investors, the stronger the locational advantage. 
5.8 Flexibility & Openness of the Dongguan Government  
To improve the locational advantage and compete for foreign investors 
with other regions, the Dongguan government maintains a high level of 
administrative flexibility under the foreign investment laws. To centralise and 
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simplify administrative procedures for foreign investment, the Dongguan 
government established the Dongguan External P&A Office in 1978. Most of the 
administration, taxation and Customs procedures can be processed through 
administrative region authorities, with the exception of contractual documents, 
which have to be processed by Guancheng district government. Moreover, some 
township governments implement policies of special privilege to attract foreign 
investors, e.g. foreign investors were granted three years instead of the usual two 
years of tax-free “holiday” and exemption from miscellaneous fees were offered 
by Liaobu, Changan, Xiegang governments up to the early 1990s. Wang also 
observed similar phenomena elsewhere in the Pearl River Delta where local 
regulations were implemented long before they were approved by the central 
government to maintain the inflow of foreign investment.67 
In general, foreign investors have full control of the production and the 
day-to-day management – foreign investors are treated as entrepreneurs and 
allowed to make profits. This is in contrast to the “iron-fist” approach adopted by 
“some towns in southern China, where a cargo will be held up by Customs if the 
firm has any overdue payments to the local government.”68 
5.9 Social Stability 
Social stability, and especially the low crime rate, is another locational 
advantage of Dongguan for foreign investors. The crime rate in Dongguan was so 
low during the 1980s that local people went to bed without locking their doors. 
With the inflow of migrants and the development of the local economy, the crime 
rate in Dongguan increased rapidly during the 1990s.69 There has been some 
improvement during the recent years as the government is aware that the safety of 
foreign investors is vital for capital to continue to flow into the area. 
At present, the crime rate fluctuates between bad and good in Dongguan. 
In Humen town, crime has increased rapidly during recent years. There have been 
regular break-ins and most foreigners do not dare go to remote areas after 10 p.m. 
Foreigners take extra care in the capital of Dongguan, Guancheng district, as it has 
the highest crime rate. Changan town now has one of the lowest crime rates in 
Dongguan, after the establishment of the “Safe Civilised District” (anquan 
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wenming xiaoou). The “Safe Civilised District” is a comprehensive 
neighbourhood watch area with patrols of hired security guards. In Fenggang 
town, the Hong Kong owner of a P&A metal mould manufacturer can walk along 
the streets at mid-night without worrying about his safety. 
5.10 Applicability of the OLI Paradigm 
In general, all the favourable investment factors can be categorised 
according to OLI framework. This is especially the case for conventionally 
favourable factors for foreign investment, e.g. low labour and land costs, 
economies of scale, etc. This is not unexpected as most, if not all, of the push-pull 
factors for investment can be classified under the broadly defined OLI framework. 
Nonetheless, the classification of investment factors into O, L or I is more 
controversial. To name a few examples, the practice of P&A production contract 
sharing and the subsequent reduction of transaction costs can be classified as 
locational rather than an internalisation advantage. This is because a firm with an 
over-used production quota may not be able to find another firm in the same 
sector with an under-used production quota in an area other than Dongguan. This 
is why pseudo integration is one of the competitive advantages of foreign-
financed firms in Dongguan and not in other areas of southern China. The ethnic 
networks and personal connections of foreign investors can be classified as an 
internalisation rather than locational advantage as the personal ties of foreign 
investors are able to dramatically reduce the information and transaction costs 
originating from the bureaucratic red-tape. 
The OLI framework is able to explain the general picture of the FDI 
pattern in the country. It is also useful to formulate the research questions in a 
structured interview. However, it may be less useful for a semi-structured 
interview, except for producing a checklist of a number of relevant parameters for 
FDI. From the discussion in this paper, the theory is unable to explain the 
following factors satisfactorily: 
¾ The ethnic networks and personal connections, which itself cannot be 
quantified meaningfully without losing its unique role and nature in foreign 
investment. 
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¾ Business styles or culture: flexible pragmatism allows the establishment of 
sub-contractual and pseudo integration, etc. 
¾ Regional differences within Dongguan in the implementation of foreign 
investment policies by local authorities, as illustrated by the retention rate of 
foreign exchange and the levy of miscellaneous fees, etc. 
No matter how powerful the OLI paradigm is, it is clear that it cannot 
explain the dynamic interaction between foreign investment and the investment 
environment at a micro-geographical level satisfactorily. It is, in fact, not 
surprising to discover that the grand theory does not fit into a local geographical 
scale comfortably as it was originally formulated to analyse macro phenomena. 
Furthermore, the semi-structured interviews conducted in an informal and friendly 
environment were able to collect much more detailed information from the 
interviewees than the formal and rather rigid framework implied by the theory. In 
fact, the flexibility of the semi-structured interview allows interviewees to point 
out factors that neither the theory nor the investigator realised its significance of, 
e.g. business culture. Therefore, the international production paradigm of FDI is 
less useful in the case study research approach, in particular, for semi-structured 
interviews. 
6 Conclusions & Implications 
Apart from the geographical endowment (such as its strategic locations), 
the effective implementation of foreign investment policy and the openness of 
local government officials to FDI are two of the reasons why Dongguan has been 
able to industrialise its economy rapidly. 
The role of Dongguan government in economic development has been 
affected by the inflow of foreign capital over time. The Dongguan government 
learned from the development experience of the “Four Little Tigers” (especially 
Singapore and Hong Kong) and Shenzhen. They realised that the role and 
significance of overseas Chinese capital for the industrialisation of Dongguan. 
When the economy started to develop and the local government gained a higher 
level of autonomy in administration and financial matter since 1988, the 
Dongguan government invested billions of yuan to develop the physical 
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infrastructure, especially motorway networks, electricity supplies and 
telecommunications facilities.70 To facilitate the growing demand for semi-skilled 
and skilled labour, the government also invested heavily in the enrichment of 
human capital endowment (entrepreneurial state). With tremendous investment in 
education, the proportion of lower secondary school graduates continuing to 
higher secondary school education increased more than three-fold, to 87% in 
1997.71 To further improve the investment environment, the Dongguan 
government tailors the social infrastructure for foreign (Hong Kong) investors’ 
demand, establishes various channels of communication to foreign investors and 
improves the social stability, etc. Obviously, the foreign investment policy and the 
policy incentives, such as tax-holiday and low land cost, implemented by the local 
and central governments are playing their roles to improve the attractiveness of 
Dongguan for foreign investors. 
Nonetheless, the evidence presented in paper suggests that other factors 
than policy incentives – such as sub-contractual and pseudo integration, local 
socuring and targeting of the Chinese market, ethnic networks and personal 
connections – are weighted more heavily by foreign investors in their decision-
making process whether to invest in Dongguan. This finding is compatible with 
the extensive survey of 3,000 TNCs conducted under the World Economic Forum: 
the World Competitiveness Report argues that the giant market size, the potential 
for sustainable growth in the next decade and the cheap labour force rather than 
taxation incentives are the main attractive aspects of China for FDI.72 Moreover, 
this finding questions the long-term effectiveness of policy incentives 
implemented by the central and local governments as the means to maintain the 
attractiveness of Dongguan (China) for FDI. This is especially the case after the 
Asian economic crisis, when the real production costs (in terms of USD) in 
Thailand, Indonesia and other Asian countries decreased substantially through 
currency depreciation while the exchange rate of renminbi remain unchanged. 
Due to the intense lobbying from governments of inland provinces, the central 
government decided to extend the policy incentives for foreign investment to the 
poorer inland provinces recently.73 Rather than improve the competitive 
advantages of inland provinces (who have under-developed physical 
infrastructure), this new policy may actually leading to a vicious circle of “policy 
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concessions” between different provinces where foreign investors maximise their 
competitive advantages by relocating their manufacturing sites from time-to-time. 
Apart from the government policy, the significance of the so-called 
“Chinese crony capitalism” or “Chinese cronyism” (where business transactions 
are largely based on personal connections rather than on purely financial grounds) 
is demonstrated at almost every level, from the formation to the operation of 
foreign-financed firms in Dongguan.74 
On the one hand, the so-called “Chinese cronyism” is able to reduce the 
transaction costs of “kinship-crony” foreign investors dramatically from the first 
phase of foreign investment on site selection, forms of investment and negotiation 
of contracts. Guidance through the bureaucratic minefields in China means the 
right connections can lower the transaction costs of daily administrative chores 
with the local government and secure better terms for investment contracts 
(including the retention rate of foreign exchange) and miscellaneous charges. The 
sharing of P&A production contracts, raw materials, machinery and spare parts 
among friendly firms is able to circumvent the bureaucratic red-tape governing the 
foreign-financed firms. It may also protect against illegitimate extortion from 
corrupt government officials. For the host country, “kinship-crony” foreign 
investment may be the source of capital inflow to assist the development of its 
economy, as clearly illustrated by the experience of Dongguan. 
On the other hand, the so-called “Chinese cronyism” unavoidably leads to 
favouritism, nepotism and even corruption.75 The special relationships between 
the government, government-funded firms and overseas Chinese-funded 
enterprises are hot-beds for generating rent-seeking activities. It also implies the 
implementation of policies which are biased against outsiders without the 
appropriate connections. This explains why the “strike hard” anti-corruption 
policy enforced by the central government has only had moderate success in 
southern China. As the “mountain is high and the king is far away” in Beijing, 
neither partners in the closely intertwined politician-entrepreneur partnership are 
willing to rock the boat and jeopardise their own safety. 
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With the 1997 contagious financial and banking crises unfolding in 
Southeast and East Asia, the negative impacts of the “Asian cronyism” have 
became exaggerated. In fact, some allegations of “Asian cronyism” are highly 
hypocritical. For instance, the capital flight out of Asia, Russia and Latin America 
during the financial crisis is the response from the market economy and the 
penalty for flawed policies and corrupt “crony capitalism”. “Crony capitalism” de 
facto exists in North America and Europe too, as demonstrated by the recent near-
collapse and the rescue of John Meriwether’s Long-Team Capital Management 
(LTCM) hedge fund, orchestrated by the New York Federal Reserve Bank.76 The 
major differences between “Asian cronyism” and “Western cronyism” (including 
“American cronyism” and European cronyism”) are the forms and magnitude of 
its occurrence.77 
In Dongguan, it is obviously that the power of guanxi network is greater 
than the law in some circumstances. The existing guanxi network game tilts the 
balance toward local government-funded enterprises and overseas Chinese-funded 
enterprises with the right connections. The Dongguan government is both 
regulator and player simultaneously. By laying down and implementing the laws 
governing foreign-financed firms, the government is the regulator (referee) of the 
game. However, the government acts as a player by participating in the game for 
profit-making purposes in the form of government-funded enterprises and JVs 
with foreign investors.78 From this perspective, the laws and regulations governing 
“Chinese crony capitalism” in Dongguan are less frequently implemented than the 
laws and regulations of “Western crony capitalism” in North America and Europe. 
Obviously, there is room for further improvement in the implementation of laws 
and regulations in Dongguan.79 To promote “long-term cost-saving” measures for 
foreign investors in Dongguan by lower the (political) transaction costs and 
reduce the rent-seeking opportunities in the Customs, the reduction of 
bureaucratic red-tape should ranked high in the policy objectives of the local and 
central governments. Rather than focus on policy incentives for foreign 
investment with questionable long-term effectiveness, the experience of 
Dongguan suggest that the investment on physical (such as physical 
infrastructure) and human capital (such as education, including the concept of the 
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“rule-of-laws”) is the cost-effective policy to improve the competitive advantages 
of China for FDI.80 
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Table 1   The Development of Roads in Dongguan, 1980-97 
 1980 1985 1990 1997 
Total road length (in km) 1,225
(100%)
1,240
(100%)
1,325 
(100%) 
2,330
(100%)
All weather roads (in km) 719
(58.69%)
810
(65.32%)
1,032 
(77.89%) 
1,949* 
(83.65%)
Graded motor roads (in km) 355
(28.98%)
490
(39.52%)
1,102 
(83.17%) 
2,087
(89.57%)
First grade
Second grade
Third grade
Fourth grade
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
355
(28.98%)
--- 
58
(4.68%)
61
(4.92%)
371
(29.92%)
6 
(0.45%) 
65 
(4.90%) 
61 
(4.60%) 
971 
(73.28%) 
690
(29.61%)
362
(15.54%)
139
(5.97%)
896
(38.45%)
Non-graded motor roads 870
(71.02%)
750
(60.48%)
223 
(16.83%) 
243
(10.43%)
Road density (in km/100km2) 49.70 50.30 53.75 94.50 
*: 1995 data. 
Source: Calculated and compiled from Dongguan Bureau of Statistics, Dongguan 
tongji nianjian 1998, p. 304. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2   Telecommunications in Dongguan, 1980-97 
 1980 1985 1990 1997 
Telephone capacity 
Switchboard (in unit)
Long distance (in line)
 
--- 
--- 
 
11,400
--- 
 
69,800 
2,100 
577,600
15,000
Subscriber households 
Telephone
Fax
Pager
Mobile phone
 
3,000
--- 
--- 
--- 
 
8,000
--- 
--- 
--- 
 
49,000 
1,193 
19,563 
546 
 
426,500
5,115
94,071
152,933
Teledensity --- 1 4 32
Number of 
telecommunications service 
centres 
50 52 53 339
Gross value of 
telecommunications market 
(in 1990 price & 10,000 
yuan) 
927 1,560 17,555 284,278
Source: Compiled from Dongguan Bureau of Statistics, Dongguan tongji nianjian 
1998, p. 307. 
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3 To parallel the “Four Little Dragons” (Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea) in 
Southeast Asia, the “Four Little Tigers” are the four fastest growing municipalities or dependent 
cities (Zhongshan, Shunde, Nanhai and Dongguan) in the world at an average annual growth rate 
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in Godfrey Yeung, Foreign Investment and Socio-economic Development in China. 
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North-East China. 1994-1995, No. 1. October 1994. Research Papers in Management Studies, 
Judge Institute of Management Studies, University of Cambridge (1994); Malcolm Warner, The 
Management of Human Resources in Chinese Industry. (London: Macmillan, 1995); Danming Lin, 
“Hong Kong’s China-invested Companies and their Reverse Investment in China.” in John Child, 
& Yuan Lu, (eds.) Management Issues in China: Volume II International Enterprises. (London: 
Routledge, 1996), pp. 165-182; and Alasdair MacBean, “China’s Foreign Trade Corporations: 
Their Role in Economic Reform and Export Success.” in Ibid., pp. 183-200, etc. 
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15 Zhen-bang Liu & Xi-wen Zhen, Dongguan touzi shiwu. (Investment Handbook in Dongguan.) 
(Dongguan: Guangdong Higher Education Publisher, 1992), pp. 1, 15; Dongguan Bureau of 
Statistics, Dongguan tongji nianjian 1998, p. 3. 
16 Dongguan Municipal Government, Zhengfu gongzuo baogao 1995. (Government Working 
Report 1995) (Official document presented in the fifth session of the Eleventh Dongguan People’s 
Congress held on 6th of July 1995), p. 43. 
17 Since the privately-funded enterprises do not have the welfare and debt burdens of their state-
owned enterprise (SOE) counterparts, the government uses their entrepreneurship to assist the 
development of high technology industry. In contrast to TNCs which are looking for alternative 
low-cost investment opportunities, the sense of belonging and local knowledge of this group of 
entrepreneurs suggests that they will engage in long-term investment in Dongguan. Dongguan 
Bureau of Statistics, Dongguan tongji nianjian 1996. (Statistical Yearbook of Dongguan 1996) 
(Official document for internal circulation), p. 25. 
18 Ibid., pp. 17, 25; Dongguan Municipal Government, Zhengfu gongzuo baogao 1994, 
(Government Working Report 1994) (Official document presented in the first session of the 
Eleventh Dongguan People’s Congress held on 18th of January 1994.), p. 220. 
19 As the consumer price index is only available from 1984 onward, therefore, the retail price 
index-based GDP deflator is used to estimate the real GDP in Dongguan. 
20 In 1997, Dongguan’s 1.47 million local population and 2,465 km2 of land accounted for 2.1% of 
the total population and 1.39% of total land area in Guangdong province and 0.12% of total 
population and 0.02% of total land area in China as a whole. Dongguan accounted for an average 
3.7% of real GDP in Guangdong and an average 0.24% of real GDP in China. The real GDP per 
capita in Dongguan was on average 1.75 times higher than that of Guangdong and on average 2.1 
times higher than that of China. Dongguan Bureau of Statistics, Dongguan tongji nianjian 1998; 
Guangdong Bureau of Statistics, Guangdong tongji nianjian 1998. (Statistical Yearbook of 
Guangdong 1998) (Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House, 1998); State Statistical Bureau, 
Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1998. (China Statistical Yearbook 1998) (Beijing: China Statistical 
Publishing House, 1998). 
21 The overwhelming majority of the migrant population are part of the labour force: 100% of 
migrants were part of the labour force in 1986 and the rate remained very high, at 90%, in 1997. 
During the 1990s, the number of migrant workers was larger than the local population workforce. 
In 1997, the 1.31 million migrant workers was about 150% higher than the 876,000 local 
workforce. Obviously, the inflow of migrants was able to keep labour costs down and this 
contributed to the high growth rate of Dongguan. Dongguan Bureau of Statistics, Dongguan tongji 
nianjian 1996, pp. 98-100; Dongguan Bureau of Statistics, Dongguan tongji nianjian 1998, pp. 
182-184. 
22 Dongguan Bureau of Statistics, Dongguan tongji nianjian 1998.; Guangdong Bureau of 
Statistics, Guangdong tongji nianjian 1998. 
23 The 647 km2 of land area in Singapore is about 26% the area that of Dongguan. In 1997, 
Singapore’s population was 3 million, which was slightly larger than the 2.92 million (including 
migrants) in Dongguan. 
24 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World Data 1995. (Washington, 
D. C.: The World Bank, 1996); Dongguan Bureau of Statistics, Dongguan tongji nianjian 1998. 
25 The decentralisation of government-owned trading firms and the subsequent improvement in 
efficiency may have contributed to the growth in export value. Before the manager responsibility 
system was enforced in 1987, the Dongguan branches of government-owned trading firms were 
allowed to regulate their own export quotas. As the economy developed, the share of export value 
channelled through the Dongguan’s Commission of Foreign Economic Relation and Trade in the 
total export value in Dongguan (the Customs’ figures) diminished from 80% in 1990 to 44% in 
1997 (Dongguan Bureau of Statistics, Dongguan tongji nianjian 1998. p. 345). As the Customs 
figures are only available from 1990 onward, this is why they are not used. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Roads are used more frequently than the railways or waterways to transport cargo. The Customs 
procedures allow container trucks to pass though one of the three Customs checkpoints in Lok Ma 
Chau, Sha Tau Kok or Man Kam To. Although the border gates are not opened 24 hours a day, 
cargo trucks are able to provide a door-to-door delivery service, which is more efficient than the 
water and rail routes as no transhipment is required. Commuters in Dongguan travelling abroad 
can use the Baiyun international airport in Guangzhou or the Huangtian airport in Shenzhen. It 
take about 30-45 minutes by car from Huangtian airport in Shenzhen to Humen town and from 
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Baiyun airport in Guangzhou to Shilong town. In railway, the development is rather piece-meal. 
Between 1987 and 1990, the Dongguan government improved the passenger and cargo terminals 
in seven out of the eight towns on the Guangzhou-Kowloon double-track railway route – Shilong, 
Chashan, Hengli, Changping, Tangxia, Zhangmutou and Genggang. A new rail station in 
Changping – the intersection points of the 174 km Guangzhou-Shenzhen high speed route, 
Guangzhou-Meizhou-Shantou route and Beijing-Kowloon route – was opened (Dongguan 
Municipal Government, Zhengfu gongzuo baogao 1988-1994). The five major ports in Guancheng, 
Shilong, Mayong, Shatian and Humen play a supportive role in cargo and passenger transportation. 
The annual cargo handling capacities of the eleven berths in Humen port is about six million 
metric tons. At 47 nautical km to Hong Kong and 48 nautical km to Macau, the daily hovercraft 
service from Humen harbour to Hong Kong is a two-hour voyage popular with Hongkongers 
working in Humen (Ibid.; Dongguan Bureau of Statistics, Dongguan tongji nianjian 1998, p.7). 
28 Dongguan Bureau of Statistics, Dongguan tongji nianjian 1996, p. 335. Dongguan, in fact, had 
more miles of paved motor road than other counties in Guangdong during the late 1980s. Ezra 
Vogel, One Step Ahead in China: Guangdong under Reform, p.179. 
29 Dongguan Municipal Government, Zhengfu gongzuo baogao 1988-1994; Dongguan Bureau of 
Statistics, Dongguan tongji nianjian 1996; Zhen-bang Liu & Xi-wen Zhen, Dongguan touzi shiwu. 
30 Dongguan Municipal Government, Zhengfu gongzuo baogao 1988-1994; Dongguan Bureau of 
Statistics, Dongguan tongji nianjian 1996; Zhen-bang Liu & Xi-wen Zhen, Dongguan touzi shiwu. 
31 The rising cost of electricity can be interpreted as an inflation-indexed price adjustment in some 
towns. For instance, the inflation-tied average annual 13% price rise in Shilong town resulted in 
the price tripling from 0.4 yuan/KWH in 1988 to 1.2 yuan/KWH in 1997. The rapid 
industrialisation in Dongguan led to an increase in the total consumption of electricity of 58 times, 
from 149 million KWH in 1978 to 8.66 billion KWH in 1997. To match the increase in demand, 
the total electricity supply also increased 58 times from 163 million KWH in 1978 to 9.49 billion 
KWH in 1997. In spite of the enormous increased in supply, electricity consumption is about 90% 
of the total electricity supply (industrial consumption of electricity accounted for 65-75%) 
(Dongguan Bureau of Statistics, Dongguan tongji nianjian 1998, p. 146.) As there is little excess 
capacity, an unexpected surge of electricity demand will lead to blackout. This is why a number of 
foreign-financed firms installed in-house electricity generators as a backup power system. 
32 Due to the differences of surcharge levied by local authorities, the rural residents in Guangdong 
pay 1.3 yuan/KWH on average, compared with the 0.96 yuan/KWH in the province as a whole. 
However, Guangdong province aims to eliminate this price difference by upgrade the rural electric 
power network and overhaul of its system of power administration. The provincial government 
will invest nine billion yuan over the next three years for laying and improving 144,100 km of 
low-voltage transmission lines, 48,200 km of high-voltage wire and the installation of 56,000 
transformers. According to the new governor, Mr Lu Ruihua, Guangdong will establish a unified 
electricity charge at 0.79 yuan/KWH when the upgrade is completed in 2002. South China 
Morning Post, “Plugs pulled on Old Power Networks.” by Matthew Miller, 15th  
December 1998, Business Post. 
33 Dongguan Municipal Government, Zhengfu gongzuo baogao 1988-1994; Dongguan Bureau of 
Statistics, Dongguan tongji nianjian 1996; Zhen-bang Liu & Xi-wen Zhen, Dongguan touzi shiwu. 
A legal cellular-phone costs about 4,000 yuan or more and the monthly subscription fee is another 
150-200 yuan. This is equivalent to two month’s salary for a factory manager in a foreign-financed 
firm or ten months wages for a migrant worker. 
34 Since the Labour Laws stipulates that the minimum age to work is 16 years old, some under-
aged workers apply for jobs with false identity cards. 
35 Dongguan Bureau of Statistics, Dongguan tongji nianjian 1998, pp. 181-184. 
36 The majority of interviewees regard female workers to be more suitable in labour-intensive 
industries while male workers are trouble-makers, getting involved in strikes, fights and other 
undesirable behaviour. This is especially the case of male migrants of Sichuan and Hunan origins. 
37 Field survey in 1996-97. The worker turnover rate has been rising rapidly since 1992, partly due 
to better information available to migrant workers. Ironically, this is the result of a more developed 
labour market. 
38 Estimated from the quarterly value, the RMB to USD exchange rate was 1.5143:1 in 1980, 
3.0691:1 in 1985, 5.0026:1 in 1990 and 8.2881:1 in 1997. 
39 Field survey in 1996-97. 
40 The apparent obedience of migrant workers is a result of “informal collaboration” between the 
local government and foreign investors. Foreign investors are able to contain and dismiss 
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disruptive workers (even illegally) with the blessing of the local government since large-scale 
labour unrest or strikes would damage the reputation of the “docile labour market” of Dongguan. 
41 For example, in Tangxia town, the rent increased five-fold from 25 yuan/m3 in 1993 to 100 
yuan/m3 in 1997. 
42 The original form of P&A is SOEs or collective enterprises which use their surplus production 
and labour capacities to process or assemble products for foreign investors. The daily managerial 
and financial power of the firms are still in Chinese firms’ hands. Zhen-bang Liu & Xi-wen Zhen, 
Dongguan touzi shiwu, pp. 10-11. 
43 The change in the appearance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) secretary in Fenggang 
town reflects the new wealth of the township governments in Dongguan. The township 
government party secretary rode his bicycle and wore a pair of shorts to meet potential foreign 
investors 15 years ago. The foreign investors were treated to a VIP reception if they intended to 
invest three million yuan in the region and the corresponding memorandum of understanding was 
signed in the best hotel in Shenzhen. The party secretary later drove a motorcycle and then a 
Toyota Crown five years ago. Today, he sits in a chauffeur-driven Mercedes-Benz limousine. 
44 As most migrants do not have enough cash to process the application, the firm employing them 
has to report to and pay the appropriate authorities before deducting the application fees from their 
wages in instalments. Foreign-financed firms in Dongguan must possess the following licences or 
certificates: (1) business registration permit, (2) national tax certificate, (3) provincial 
(Guangdong) tax certificate, (4) certificate of Quality Licence for Export Commodities, (5) 
certificate of Quarantine Licence for Export Commodities, (6) hygiene certificate, (7) labour 
insurance certificate and (8) health insurance certificate. 
45 The Regulations on the Unemployment Insurance in Dongguan was implemented from 1 
January 1997 onward. The monthly insurance premium is 1% of the average monthly 
remuneration of all employees in the firm during the last financial year. Dongguan Bureau of 
Statistics, Dongguan tongji nianjian 1998, p. 93-97. 
46 The local government imposes a fine of 200-1,000 yuan on those firms employing workers 
without all the required permits. In some cases, workers do not possess employment permits 
because their previous employers had not completed the appropriate application procedures before 
they resigned. They are usually employed as temporary workers and their employers do not sign 
formal employment contracts with them. In fact, some migrants prefer to work on a temporary 
basis as it allows them to job-hop. 
47 Any departments could charge “any amount of money” without legal grounds during the late 
1980s. This is partly the result of the self-financing reforms as most government bureaux explored 
every means to raise revenue, both legitimate and illegitimate. In response to constant complaints 
by foreign investors, the Dongguan government conducted a survey of foreign-financed firms on 
the legitimacy of the miscellaneous charges after Mr Li Jin-wei was elected as the Dongguan CCP 
secretary. At present, all miscellaneous charges levied to foreign-financed and locally-funded 
enterprises must be approved by the Dongguan government (Dongguan Bureau of Statistics, 
Dongguan tongji nianjian 1998, p. 83.). In an effort to stamp out illegal charges, the corresponding 
authorities issue receipts for every item of miscellaneous charge. 
48 Each of the 38 McDonald’s restaurants in Beijing has to pay 31 fees, most of which are 
unauthorised. According to the investigation conducted by the Beijing mayor’s special tribunal, 
only two of the 31 fees are totally justified – such as the US$600-1,200 per year trash collection 
fee –, while eight are questionable and 17 are illegitimate. For example, the US$360-600 charge a 
year for “spiritual civilisation”, a campaign led by President Jiang Zemin that has covered Beijing 
in banners telling people to be more civilised (International Herald Tribune, “China’s Tax 
Collectors on a Roll at McDonald’s.” 11th September 1997, p. 17.). In 1998, the central 
government disciplined 1,273 local officials for levied illegitimate miscellaneous fees on 
enterprises. To improve the investment environment, the central government abolished 973 items 
of miscellaneous fees with a total value of 45 billion yuan per annum, while the local governments 
removed another staggering 26,710 items of miscellaneous fees with a total value of 98.5 billion 
yuan in 1998. In six provinces (Guangdong, Jiangsu, Hebei, Henan, Hunan and Sichuan), the items 
of arbitrary levies decreased by 30% (Hong Kong Standard, “Blitz on Random Fee Scams.” 23rd 
February 1999). 
49 Field survey in 1996-97. 
50 The central government also exercise backdated charges. In July 1998, the State Administration 
of Taxation announced that an 8% of value-added tax (VAT) on the export value of import 
processing P&A firms (laiyang jiagong, where P&A firms importing raw materials and exporting 
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finished products on their own accounts) would be implemented from 1st January 1999. As the new 
VAT law is backdated for two years, the Guangdong Provincial Foreign Economic and Trade 
Commission estimates that the new VAT law will wipe off the combined 1997 profits of the 
import processing P&A firms. Due to the slowing down of FDI and lobbying effort of Guangdong 
government, the State Council decided to grand a two-year tax relief on the new VAT law for the 
import processing P&A firms established before 1994. However, the tax relief is not applicable to 
the import processing P&A firms established after 1994 as their export VAT are calculated 
according to the same criteria as the locally-funded exporters. To circumvent the VAT, the P&A 
firms can changed from import processing to contract processing (lailiao jiagong, where P&A 
firms manufacturing finished goods for clients who import their own raw materials). South China 
Morning Post, “VAT rise to Strike Exports.” by Renee Lai, 27th November 1998, Business Post; 
South China Morning Post, “Ventures threatened by back-dated VAT.” by Renee Lai, 3rd 
December 1998, Business Post; South China Morning Post, “Investors win Breathing Space as 
Mainland VAT Delayed Two Years.” by Renee Lai & Matthew Miller, 17th December 1998, 
Business Post. 
51 A number of foreign investors air their grievances about the extent of involuntary donations and 
extortion. In 1995, the Public Security Bureau officials went to every foreign-financed firm in a 
town of Dongguan with 1,000 yuan receipts for donations for the completion of the Public Security 
Bureau headquarters. In 1996, five People’s Armed Police officers armed with AK-47 rifles 
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